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for an adequate consideration, the power would have been exercised. 21
But a quit claim conveyance, as in the principal case, will not ordinarily show an intent to exercise the power because it purports to
convey only the interest possessed by the grantor.2 2 However, the
widow's conveyance executed her power because her intent was clear;
she attempted to set up a trust to exist after her death and her own
property was insufficient for that purpose. 23 The absence of a consideration was immaterial because she intended the conveyance to
V.R.B.
operate as a gift.

TORTS
RIGHT OF PRIVACY OF PUBLIC CHARACTERS
The defendant published and advertised a biographical sketch of
the plaintiff, a much publicized child prodigy of 30 years ago, under
the title of "Where Are They Now?" showing the present povertystricken position of plaintiff. Plaintiff sued for damages for violation of his common law right of privacy in states where publication
occurred. Held, for ,defendant. The invasion of the plaintiff's common law right of privacy was privileged because he is still a subject
of public interest. 1
Where the common law right of privacy is recognized,2 it is agreed
21

v. Buennagel, 94 Ind. 228 (1884); South v. South, 91 Ind.
221 (1883); Rinkenberger v. Meyer, 155 Ind. 152, 56 N.E. 913
(1900).
22 Fraizer v. Hassey, 43 Ind. 310 (1873); Meister v. Francisco, 229
N.W. 643, 127 A.L.R. 242, 248 (Wis. 1940).
Note (1940)
28 O'Brien v. Flint, 74 Conn. 502, 51 Atl. 547 (1902).
127 A.L.R. 248.
1 Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corporation, 113 F. (2d) 806 (C.C.A. 2d, 1940).
The court also denied recovery under the NEW YORK Crv RIGHTS
LAW, Secs. 50, 51, (Consol. Laws, C. 6) on the ground that neither
defendant's article nor the picture of plaintiff was published for
purposes of trade within the meaning of the statute. The court
admitted that defendant's article was forecast 'for advertising
purposes' but held that the advertisement shared the same privilege as the article. Cf. Almind v. Sea Beach Railway Co., 157
App. Div. 230, 141 N.Y. Supp. 842 (2d Dep't 1913). The fact
that plaintiff's name and picture, as required for recovery under
the statute, was not used in the advertisement was stressed. But
that situation is analogous to the principle in libel that reference
to plaintiff need not be direct in publication to constitute libel.
ShaW, Cleaners and Dyers, Inc. v. Des Moines Dress Club, 215
Iowa 1130, 245 N.W. 231 (1932).
2 The right of privacy, usually defined as a personal right "to be let
alone," did not exist at early common law, but was afforded inarticulate protection in equity when its violation involved: a property right, Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. R. 670
(ch. 1818); an implied contract, Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 1 H.
& Tw. 28, 47 Eng. Rep. R. 1313 (ch. 1825); or a breach of faith,
Yovatt v. Winyard, 1 J. & W. 394, 37 Eng. Rep. R. 425 (ch. 1820).
The first advocation of an explicitly recognized right of privacy
was presented by Warren and Brandeis, The Right To Privacy
(1890) 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins.
Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) was th first unequivocal
fDownie

NOTES AND COMMENTS

that public interest in obtaining information may become dominant
over the individual's desire for privacy.3 Whether there is a public
interest in certain matters, and when that interest becomes dominant
over private interests, are both questions of law 4 and must be decided
in view of the facts in each case.6
Judicial definitions of 'public interest' as applied to a privacy case
are lacking. But the term seems to mean well-founded, widespread
concern amounting to more than mere curiosity, in matters of public
consequence. 6 In setting up limits to the right of privacy,7 the parallel
limitation in libel of the qualified privilege on matters of public interest was adopted.8 Matters of public interest in libel and slander
have been grouped as affairs of state, administration of justice, public
institutions, and local authorities, ecclesiastical affairs, artistic matters, and matters relating to appeals for public patronage.9
It was not denied in the principal case that the plaintiff had at
one time been a public figure. But under the law of libel it has many
times been held that public interest exists only in such things as invite public attention or call for public comment and does not follow
a public man into his private life'0 except insofar as his private life
may affect performance of his public calling." It would seem, therejudicial acceptance of the doctrine. Recognition as a common law
right is also given in Kentucky, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, New
Jersey, and North Carolina. Note (1940) 38 Mich. L. Rev. 748.
a Invasion of right of privacy has been held privileged in Corliss v.
E. W. Walker Co., 64 Fed. 280 (D. Mass. 1894) (Plaintiff a public
figure); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931)
(a criminal); Jones v. Harold Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S..W.
(2d) 972 (1929) and Smith v. Suratt, 7 Alaska 416 (1926) (a
participant in a recent event of public interest). For a general
discussion of limitation of right of privacy, see Ragland, The
Right of Privacy (1929) 17 Ky. L. J. 85, 110.
4
BUTrON, LIBEL AND SLANDER (1935) 107.
5 Pavesih v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68 (1905).
6 Though not defining 'public interest,' a distinction is made between
it and mere curiosity. Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal.
App. (2d) 304, 95 P. (2d) 491 (1939); Adams, The Right of
Privacy and Its Relation to the Law of Libel (1905) 39 Am. L.
Rev. 37, 51.
7Warren and Brandeis, The Right To Privacy (1890) 4 Harv. L. Rev.
193. These limitations received judicial recognition in toto in
Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967 (1927).
8 Ragland, The Right of Privacy (1929 17 Ky. L. J. 85, 111.
9
NEwErz LmEL AND SLANDER (4th ed. 1924) 535; ODGERS, LIBEL AND
SLANDER (6th ed. 1929) 169.
10 Hills v. Press Co., 122 Misc. 212, 202 N.Y. Supp. 678 (1924), affirmed without opinion, 214 App. Div. 752, 209 N. Y. Supp. 848
(1925); Duncombe v. Daniell, 8 Car. and P. 222 (C. P. 1837),
173 Eng. Rep. R. 470.
11 Epps v: Duckett, 284 Mo. 132, 223 S.W. 572 (1920) ; see in general:
Ragland, The Right of Privacy (1929) 17 Ky. L. J. 85, 113. This
theory has been judicially recognized. Pavesfiih v. New England
Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68 (1905); Brex v. Smith, 104
N. J. Eq. 386, 146 At. 34 (1929). Contra: Corliss v. Walher Co.,
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fore, that the article, involved in the principal case, dealing with the
private life of plaintiff should not have been privileged even had it
been published at the time plaintiff wa offering his talents to the
public. Why, then, should the article be privileged, when published
almost three decades later?
The court justifies its decision by saying that "

.

.

. The mis-

fortunes and frailities of neighbors and public figures are subjects
of considerable interest and discussion to the rest of the population.
And when such are the mores of the community, it would be unwise
for a court to bar their expression in the newspapers and magazines
of the day."'12 But only reasonable custom and usage will justify an
act.' 3 Thirty years' retirement from public life should end the general
public's interest in the plaintiff. 14 But the instant case indicates that
the plaintiff cannot regain his privacy. The public will always have
such an interest in his life. To deprive a person desiring seclusion
of protection from public comment because of events long since past
seems to be an undesirable limitation upon his right of privacy.15
P.C.M.
MUTUAL VITUPERATION IN LIBEL
The plaintiff published in a newspaper a letter which libeled the
defendant. A week later the defendant published in the same newspaper a letter which libeled plaintiff. The plaintiff sued and the
64 Fed. 280 (D. Mass. 1894). The court in Atkinson v. Doherty, 121 Mich. 372, 80 N. W. 285 (1899) denied the existence of
the right of privacy, but in commenting upon the Coriiss case said,
"We are loathe to believe that the man who makes himself useful
to mankind surrenders any right of privacy thereby."
12 Sides v. F-R. Pub. Corporation, 113 F. (2d) 806, 809 (C.C.A. 2d,
1940).
13 6 THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE (1905) 776.
An exception to this rule seems to be found, however, in the case
of acts done by physicians and surgeons in practice. Supra vol.
5 at p. 1083.
14 The court in the principal case did not mention the case of Mau v.
Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N. D. Cal. 1939) in which
recovery for invasion of plaintiff's right of privacy was allowed
against defendant, who broadcast a reproduction of a holdup in
which plaintiff had been the victim. In that case less than two
years had elapsed between time of hold-up and tortious publication, but yet invasion was not privileged-a fact which would seem
to indicate that the court felt there was no public interest remaining.
15No Indiana cases have been found discussing right of privacy by
that name, but the Indiana Supreme Court has held that in an
action for slander the defendant is not entitled, under a plea of
justification, to an order requiring plaintiff to submit to a medical
examination. Kern v. Bridwell, 119 Ind. 226, 21 N. E. 664 (1889).
But cf. South Bend v. Turner, 156 Ind. 418, 60 N. E. 271 (1901)
(Upheld order for examinatiorn in personal injury suit). The
former decision, since it resulted in the preservation of the plaintiff's dignity, may tend to show the position Indiana courts will
take when the question of right of privacy comes clearly before
them.

